Αποτελέσματα Αναζήτησης
Aristotle gives an account of thinking (or intellect—noêsis) that is modeled on his account of perception in Book II. Just as in perception, “that which perceives” (to aisthêtikon) takes on sensible form (without matter), so in thinking “that which thinks” (to noêtikon) takes on intelligible form (without matter).
A proper articulation of Aristotle’s conception of deliberation requires a distinction between three objects of desire that lie at different points of the spectrum from the maximally general to the maximally specific.
1 Ιαν 2011 · The intention of this paper is to briefly sketch several of Socrates and Plato's contributions to experiential education, and then, in more detail, examine Aristotle as a progenitor of the...
This essay elucidates Aristotle's analysis of the sense of touch in De anima and argues that tactility provides a paradigm for sensitivity in general and in particular for the reflexivity of...
These reflections on method in psychology bring into focus Aristotle’s decision to describe psychic phenomena in terms of his broader explanatory framework: he articulates his account of the soul and its faculties as special cases of his general hylomorphism.
In this book, Paula Gottlieb takes a fresh look at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean. She shows how they form a thought-provoking ethic of virtue, one that...
I. Meaning: Language and Reality. This part of the paper is divided into two Sections. Section I ex. amines a three-part relation among objects, thought, and language. from the De interpretatione that shows how Aristotle conceived of the nature of mental representation.
