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10 Αυγ 2015 · In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action.
- Shared Agency
1. The traditional ontological problem and the Intention...
- Practical Reason and The Structure of Actions
A wave of recent philosophical work on practical rationality...
- Cognitive Science
5.1 Philosophical Applications. Much philosophical research...
- Theories of Free Will
An occurrence produced in this way and in these...
- Collective Intentionality
The main philosophical challenge connected with the analysis...
- Events
Although not undisputed, some standard differences between...
- Embodied Cognition
The morphological properties of an agent’s body will...
- Autonomy: Personal
–––, 2014, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, New York:...
- Shared Agency
Agency (philosophy) - Wikipedia. Agency is the capacity of an actor to act in a given environment. It is independent of the moral dimension, which is called moral agency. In sociology, an agent is an individual engaging with the social structure.
5 Ιουν 2012 · The intuition underlying Frankfurt's introduction of this notion is that it is essential to the characterization of a human agent or person, that is to the demarcation of human agents from other kinds of agent.
The au- thors conceptualize agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its “iterational” or habit- ual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a “projective” capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a “practical-evaluative” capacity to contextualize past habits ...
In her main contribution to the philosophy of action, Anscombe (1957) did not use the term ‘agency’ at all. Davidson used it on occasion, but always under the assumption that agency is, essentially, intentional action (see, especially, Davidson 1971).
1 Απρ 2014 · This essay attempts to answer three questions about Aristotle’s account of agency: (1) What is an action? (2) Under what conditions is an action voluntary or intentional? (3) What is the relation between an agent and an action when he or she acts voluntarily?
the concept of agency is introduced by philosophers, such as agency as the capacity to ‘make things happen,’ ‘make a di$erence,’ or ‘cause some kind of change.’ The trouble is that these characterizations can be used in ways that appear too broad. These expressions might refer,
